The Crisis of the Italy Political System Part 9

There was a vote in some important cities of the North such as Turin and Milan, and of the South such as Catania; it was a limited but significant sample. Almost everywhere there was a run-off on June 20. The elections recorded – in the national summary – a serious defeat of the DC, down to 18.7% compared to 29.4 for the municipal ones and 25.2 for the previous policies; a certain resistance of the PDS with 11.7%; the collapse of the PSI (3.7%) and of the secular parties; the success of Rifondazione in the North where it surpassed the PDS and, again in the North, the triumph of the Lega which with 32% became the first party (10.4 DC; 10.7 PDS; 1.0 PSI; 11.3 Rifondazione). At the Center 20.1 AD; 22.0 PDS; 1.6 Alloy; 4.4 PSI. In the South 28.3 AD (starting from over 40%); 9.1 PDS; 7.5 PSI. In general, the DC candidates were defeated, while the PDS alliance system was rewarded. The second rounds confirmed the successes of the League in the North (which won in Milan, Varese, Novara, Vercelli, Pavia, etc.), of the PDS candidates especially in the center and in Campania (Ravenna, Ancona, Siena, Grosseto and then Torre del Greco, Pozzuoli, etc.), also to a small extent by the MSI in some municipalities in the center and in the south. The DC obtained only 9 out of 145 mayors. Particularly significant was the victory of the Northern League player M. Formentini (57.1%) over N. Dalla Chiesa della Rete supported by PDS and Rifondazione. In the homeland of tangentopoli, until then a socialist stronghold, the PSI collected only 1.6% of the votes.

According to itypetravel, the Ciampi government undertook its work of reorganization facilitated by a new agreement on labor costs (the automatic mechanisms for adjusting wages decreased, the escalator was definitively abolished), but hampered by the difficulty of reconciling – in a system of widespread public support for the economy that everyone benefited from, from businesses to workers – the reduction of spending and the relaunch of productive activities with growing unemployment. In harmony with the government’s guidelines, the Bank of Italy proceeded to gradually reduce the cost of money. The introduction of new management criteria (e.g. the

In the meantime, the government had to face a serious disagreement with the UN on the conduct of the pacification intervention in Somalia, where an Italian military contingent was also operating and was accused of not being subject to the directives of the unified command. But the dissent concerned the Italian line aimed more at the search for a political solution than at the armed repression of the Somali factions.

Even the Ciampi government had to face the problems deriving from new very serious episodes of mafia terrorism (considered as such even if not claimed) carried out using car bombs and this time occurred outside Sicily. The first attack took place on May 14, in a street in the Parioli district in Rome, a few seconds after the car of the popular journalist M. Costanzo (reported for many television broadcasts against the mafia) and his escort passed by, causing about twenty injured and very serious damage. On the night of May 27, another car bomb exploded in Florence on the back of the Uffizi, causing five deaths as well as the destruction of a part of the museum and the Georgofili academy. Two months later, at midnight on July 27-28, three bombs exploded, the first in Milan in Via Palestro (five dead), the other two almost simultaneously in Rome, in front of the church of S. Giorgio in Velabro and next to the Lateran palace. Back in Sicily, on 18 September, near Catania, a car bomb placed in front of a carabinieri barracks caused some injuries. The attacks were interpreted as a reaction of the mafia, cornered by the revelations of repentants and by many arrests of prominent figures of the criminal organization (including S. Riina in January and B. Santapaola in May), in the face of the most effective investigative action and the most vigorous repression by the state. Furthermore, it had returned forcefully to the fore, especially after the murder of the Christian Democrat MEP S. Lima (12 March 1992), former mayor of Palermo and exponent of the Andreotti current, the problem,

The conviction that only a new electoral law and a rapid recourse to early elections could have renewed a policy polluted by innumerable illicit behaviors and frequent, documented relations with organized crime had gained ground in public opinion. But the new electoral law, a prerequisite for calling the country to the polls, was struggling to see the light, while a new, very serious scandal broke out on the tangentopoli front.

It was the intricate story of the Enimont – the failed attempt to create a single large chemical pole, half public and half private (ENI-Montedison) in the period 1989-90. The Ferruzzi group, led by R. Gardini, had tried to appropriate it entirely, but in the end the public hand prevailed with a sale, considered extremely advantageous for the Ferruzzi, of the Montedison stake to ENI. The magistrates reconstructed, on the basis of numerous confessions, a huge round of bribes paid to politicians on both sides. Moreover, the management of ENI was already accused of illicit financing, a behavior that had characterized from its origins, from the time of its founder E. Mattei, the relations of the oil company with the government parties, and sometimes of opposition. The case had dramatic and unpredictable developments with the suicides of the president of ENI G. Cagliari, detained for over four months in the prison of S. Vittore in Milan, and of R. Gardini which took place a few days later on 20 and 23 July. The subsequent arrest in September of the vicar president of the civil court of Milan, D. Curtò, for having received a large bribe from the judicial custodian of the Enimont shares designated by himself in one of the most bitter moments of conflict between ENI and Montedison, testified to the size and the gravity of the scandal.

The Crisis of the Italy Political System 9